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abstract
The focus of this essay is Kant’s argument in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics 
of Morals (gms) iii that regarding oneself as rational implies regarding oneself as 
free. After setting out an interpretation of how the argument is meant to go (§§1-2), 
I argue that Kant fails to show that regarding oneself as free is incompatible with 
accepting universal causal determinism (§3). However, I suggest that the argument 
succeeds in showing that regarding oneself as rational is inconsistent with accepting 
universal causal determinism if one accepts a certain, plausible view of the explana-
tion of events (§4).
Keywords: I. Kant, free will, Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals, 
theoretical rationality.
resumen
El ensayo se enfoca en el argumento de Kant en la Fundamentación de la  metafísica 
de las costumbres (gms) iii según el cual considerarse racional implica verse a uno 
mismo como libre. Se interpreta la forma en que debe entenderse el argumento 
(§§1-2) y se afirma que Kant no logra demostrar que considerarse libre es incompati-
ble con la aceptación del determinismo casual universal (§3). No obstante, se sugiere 
que el argumento sí logra demostrar que considerarse a uno mismo como racional es 
incompatible con la aceptación del determinismo casual universal, si se acepta una 
cierta versión plausible de la explicación de los eventos (§4).
Palabras clave: I. Kant, libre albedrío, Fundamentación de la metafísica de 
las costumbres, racionalidad teórica.
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The Argument in Context
Philosophers most often deal with the question of free will in 
connection with moral issues. For example, the question of whether 
determinism and free will are compatible is usually of interest to people 
who are concerned about the implications of determinism for moral 
responsibility: free will is a prerequisite for moral responsibility, the 
thought goes, so if determinism rules out free will and determinism 
is a fact, then none of us are morally responsible for our actions. It is 
unsurprising, then, that Kant’s main interest in free will also has to do 
with questions pertaining to morality. What is surprising, though, is 
that Kant not only thinks that freedom of some kind must be presup-
posed in order to regard ourselves as morally responsible, but also that 
freedom must be presupposed in order to regard ourselves as theoreti-
cally rational (i.e. capable of rationality in the theoretical, as opposed 
to the practical, domain). But why exactly Kant thinks this is not en-
tirely easy to determine. Here I will focus on the argument as it occurs 
in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, though, of course, in 
attempting to explain that argument, I will make reference to what he 
says about the issue elsewhere as well.
Kant’s goal in the third section of the Groundwork is to show that 
the categorical imperative applies to all rational agents. In order to do 
so, Kant needs to show that all rational agents must be regarded as free 
in some way, because in order for the categorical imperative to apply to 
an agent, that agent must be capable of acting or failing to act accord-
ingly. Thus, Kant begins the first part of section iii (“The Concept of 
Freedom is the Key to the Explanation of the Autonomy of the Will”) 
with the analysis of the concept of freedom. He starts with a negative 
characterization: freedom is a property of the will “that it [the will] can 
be efficient independently of alien causes determining it” (gms 446; cf. 
kpvv 33 and krv a543/b 562).1 To say that the free will operates “inde-
pendently of alien causes” is not, however, to say that it does not operate 
according to any cause. On the contrary, since the will is a cause, and 
Kant thinks that all causes must act in accordance with laws, even the 
free will must act in accordance with some laws. So, in order for a will 
to be free, it must operate according to laws that it imposes on itself. 
This leads to Kant’s positive characterization of freedom as “the will’s 
property of being a law to itself” (g iv447; cf. kpv v33 and ms vi214). 
Equivalently, a free will is an autonomous will.
Now, in gms ii, Kant had argued that for a will to act autono-
mously is for it to act in accordance with the categorical imperative, 
I thank Des Hogan, Tim Stoll and Dimitris Tsementzsis for this discussion.
1 All translations are Gregor (1996).
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the moral law. Thus, Kant famously remarks: “a free will and a will 
under moral laws is one and the same” (ibd.) and therefore to show that 
the moral law applies to all rational beings, it will suffice to show 
that those beings are free: “If, therefore, freedom of the will is presupposed, 
morality together with its principle follows from it by mere analysis of 
its concept” (ibd.).
The question of whether freedom of the will can be presupposed 
is taken up in the next part of section three, which is titled “Freedom 
Must be Presupposed as a Property of the Will of All Rational Beings.” 
After setting up the task as that of giving an a priori proof of freedom of 
the will (gms iv 447-448), Kant claims that if a rational being must view 
itself as free, or “must act under the idea of freedom”, then that being is 
free in a practical respect. By referring to the kind of freedom that he 
wants to show that all rational agents have as “freedom in a practical 
respect”, Kant is distinguishing his project from that of showing that 
every rational agent is in fact free, which Kant refers to as “freedom in a 
theoretical respect” (cf. Kant’s footnote to iv 448). To show that all ratio-
nal agents have freedom in a theoretical respect would be to show that all 
rational agents are free. To show that all rational agents are free in a prac-
tical respect, by contrast, would be merely to show that all rational agents 
must regard themselves as free. The reason why it is sufficient for Kant’s 
purposes to prove only that all rational beings are free in a practical re-
spect is that being free in a practical respect means being committed to 
viewing the moral law as applying to oneself. For, as we said before, 
to be free is just to act in accordance with the moral law.
Thus, the crucial part of the argument is the next step, in which 
Kant argues that all rational beings are free in a practical respect. It is 
in this portion of the argument that the key passage that I want to deal 
with occurs. Kant begins by asserting that for “[every rational being] 
we think of a reason that is practical, that is, has causality with respect 
to its objects” (giv 448). The idea that the will is a “causality with re-
spect to objects” is meant to suggest that to have practical reason is to 
have a will that is capable of generating reasons for action from itself.2 
Here Kant is making the same distinction we saw at the beginning of 
the section with respect to freedom. What Kant wants to say is that in 
order to view oneself as having a practical will, one must regard one’s 
will itself as generating motivation for acting. If one only views oneself 
as acting on the basis of impulses, then one cannot also view oneself as 
having a practical will.
2 The way Kant phrases it is somewhat difficult because he seems to imply that every will 
is a practical will. Regardless of whether Kant really thinks this, I will take him here to 
be talking about a specifically practical will.
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Now, the passage that I want to focus on throughout the rest of this 
essay occurs immediately after the sentence just quoted. I quote it in full, 
labeling the two sentences for clarity in my later discussion:
[1] Now, one cannot possibly think of a reason that would consciously 
receive direction from any other quarter with respect to its judgements, 
since the subject would then attribute the determination of his judgment 
not to his reason but to an impulse. [2a] Reason must regard itself as the 
author of its principles independently of alien influences; [2b] conse-
quently, as practical reason or as the will of a rational being it must be 
regarded of itself as free, that is, the will of such a being cannot be a will 
of his own except under the idea of freedom, and such a will must in a 
practical respect thus be attributed to every rational being. (giv 448)3,4
Now, Sentence 2 states the conclusion of the argument, and specifi-
cally, the part of the conclusion that is of most interest for our purposes, 
is 2a, so let us begin our analysis of this passage by considering that. 
What does Kant mean when he says, “Reason must regard itself as the 
author of its principles independently of alien influences?” There are 
three questions here: (1) What is Kant referring to when he talks about 
“Reason”?; (2) What is it to say that “reason must regard itself as ...?”; 
and (3) What is it for reason to be “the author of its principles indepen-
dently of alien influences?”
Regarding (1), the context of the argument is, of course, a discus-
sion specifically of practical reason. So one might think that Kant is 
making a point here only about the practical domain. But I believe it 
is fair to think that Kant is talking about both practical and theoretical 
reason based on three considerations. First, Kant states the argument 
in terms of reason as such, so, taken at face value, it seems obvious that 
we ought to take him as speaking not only about practical reason, but 
about theoretical reason as well. Second, when one considers the ar-
gument, it seems clear that if it is sound, it will apply just as much to 
theoretical reason as to practical reason. So, even if Kant had framed 
the argument specifically in terms of practical reason, it would still 
be reasonable to extend the argument to apply to the theoretical case 
3 „Nun kann man sich unmöglich eine Vernunft denken, die mit ihrem eigenen Bewußtseyn 
in Ansehung ihrer Urtheile anderwärts her eine Lenkung empfienge, denn alsdenn 
würde das Subject nicht seiner Vernunft, sondern einem Antriebe, die Bestimmung der 
Urtheilskraft zuschreiben. Sie muß sich selbst als Urheberin ihrer Principien ansehen, 
unabhängig von fremden Einflüssen, folglich muß sie als practische Vernunft, oder als 
Wille eines vernünftigen Wesens, von ihr selbst als frey angesehen werden; d.i. der Wille 
desselben kann nur unter der Idee der Freyheit ein eigener Wille seyn, und muß also in 
practischer Absicht allen vernünftigen Wesen beygelegt werden.“
4 All German quotations are from the Akademie Ausgabe.
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as well.5 And third, Kant does at least in one point make this same ar-
gument in specific connection with theoretical reason, namely in the 
review of Schulz, which will be discussed below.
So much, then, for what the intended referent of “reason” here is. Now, 
regarding (2) there seems to be two questions that need to be answered: 
a) what, in general, is meant when Kant says that x must regard itself as y? 
And b), what does it mean for reason to have to regard itself as whatever? I 
shall have relatively little to say in response to a) other than to point out the 
difference between the claim that reason must hold that it is free and the 
claim that reason must regard itself as free. The difference between 
the two might elude the casual reader, insofar as locutions like the fol-
lowing seem to mean roughly the same thing: “I regard her as the best 
athlete on campus” and “I think that she is the best athlete on campus.” 
But it is clear that in this context the claim that reason must regard itself 
as f is not equivalent to the claim that reason must hold that it is f. This is 
seen from the fact that Kant is very careful to make clear that he does not 
intend to give a theoretical proof, but rather a practical proof of freedom 
of the will. The difference between these two kinds of proof is precisely 
the difference between showing that some claim is true and showing that 
we must act or think as if some claim is true, where this leaves open the 
theoretical question of whether the claim is true or not.
What it is to regard x as y, in Kant’s sense, then, seems intuitive 
enough. But why does Kant say that reason must regard itself as free 
instead of that we must regard ourselves as free? One way to gloss this 
claim might be to say that insofar as we are rational, we must regard 
ourselves as free. But I think this is unsatisfactory since it seems to im-
ply that we are rationally obligated to think that we are free. But if Kant 
has shown that we are rationally obligated to believe that we are free, 
then he seems to have given a theoretical proof of the proposition rath-
er than a practical proof. A better way to gloss Kant’s conclusion, then, 
would be to say that insofar as we take ourselves to be rational, we must 
take ourselves to be free. This gloss would explain why Kant frames his 
conclusion in the immediately surrounding context as that freedom 
is a property of all rational beings. The thought is that to be rational is 
to be free in a certain sort of way so if one regards oneself as rational, 
one must regard oneself as free.
Having said this much, we are able to provide a rough sketch of 
what the argument in this passage is supposed to be.
1. What it is for a will to be free is for it to act autonomously (the 
positive definition of freedom), or equivalently, for it to act inde-
pendently of alien influences (the negative definition of freedom).
5 This point is also made by Mieth and Rosenthal (cf.254).
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2. To take oneself to be rational is to take oneself as able to act or 
believe independently of alien influences.
3. Therefore, to take oneself to be rational is to take oneself to act 
or believe independently of alien influences.
The main interpretative question that remains for us is, then, to 
explain why does Kant endorse 2. And to answer this, we must answer 
the question of what Kant means when he refers to reason being inde-
pendent of alien influences.
By “alien influences” (fremden Einflüssen), Kant seems to mean any 
sort of impulse that has its origin in the natural, or in Kant’s words, “phe-
nomenal” world. Thus, Kant is providing here a kind of argument against 
determinism: we cannot rationally believe that determinism extends so far 
as to include even our beliefs and rational assessments, because if we do, 
then we abolish the possibility of regarding any of our beliefs as rational. 
To see why Kant thinks this, let us turn to Sentence 1.
Why Does Theoretical Rationality Imply Freedom?
The thought in Sentence 1 is, I think, best illustrated by an example. 
If I form the belief that quiche is an unhealthy food and realize upon 
reflection that the only reason for my belief is a dislike for its taste, then 
I cannot regard the belief that quiche is unhealthy as rational. In this 
case it was not my rational faculty, or as Kant simply puts it, “reason” 
that was active in forming the belief at all. It is not the case that one way 
of using one’s reason is by being guided by impulses in this way; rather, 
this is a way of not employing one’s reason. This is why Kant says that 
“one cannot possibly think of a reason” (iv 448) that would be affected 
in this kind of way.
So, if we want to understand Kant’s argument, we ought to begin 
by analyzing cases such as these. Let us focus on the following case. 
Suppose Ned has some belief p and comes to believe that the reason 
that he believes p is because of, say, the presence of a certain chemical 
in the drinking water. In this case, the rational basis that Ned has for 
believing the proposition in question is completely undercut. Upon 
finding out the unsavory origin of his belief, he is rationally obligated 
to decrease his credence in the proposition. So, one way to make sense 
of Kant would be to find the principle that underlies the fact that Ned 
cannot rationally take himself to be rationally justified in believing p 
and explain why one might think that this principle applies to all of 
one’s beliefs if determinism is true. So, what might this principle be? 
One, I think, clearly unsatisfactory answer might be something like 
the following:
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(P1) If s discovers that he believes p purely based on material causes, 
then s cannot take himself to be rationally justified in holding 
that belief.
This principle, if true, would of course get Kant to his desired con-
clusion. But it is problematic for several reasons. First, the fact that the 
cause of the belief in Ned’s case is the outcome of material causes is ir-
relevant to whether Ned is justified in his belief. To see this, we can just 
modify the case so that instead of a chemical in the drinking water, it 
is an immaterial demon that is responsible for implanting the belief in 
Ned’s mind. And according to that same case, we can see that some-
thing like the following principle cannot do the necessary explanatory 
work either:
(P2) If s discovers that she believes p purely based on deterministic 
causes, then s cannot take herself to be rationally justified in 
holding that belief.
This principle cannot be correct either because we can just suppose 
that the demon responsible for implanting the belief had free will and 
implanted the belief in one’s mind. But, even more importantly, there 
seem to be plenty of obvious cases of one’s holding a belief based on purely 
material or deterministic causes, where this fact in no way undermines 
the rational credibility of the belief. For example, I have the belief that 
there is a book on my desk because I see it. And seeing the book seems 
to be a purely material and deterministic process. So the real reason why 
Ned is not justified in holding his belief cannot be sufficiently explained 
by the mere fact that his belief had a material origin or that it was the 
outcome of deterministic processes.
A more promising approach would stress the fact that in Ned’s case, 
if p does turn out to be true, this would be an example of mere epistemic 
luck. Although he has no reason to think that p is true, he also has no 
reason to think that p is false. Thus, one might think that the reason 
why Ned would not be justified in believing p has to do with the fact 
that his belief was caused by factors that do not bear on the truth of p. 
So, we might use the following principle:
(P3) If s believes p as a result of factors that do not bear on the truth 
of p, then s is not justified in believing p.
In order for Kant to get to his desired conclusion, then, he would 
need, in addition to (P3), something like:
(P4) If s believes that p as a result of deterministic processes, then s 
believes p as a result of factors that do not bear on the truth of p.
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The interpretive approach of attributing this principle or some-
thing like it to Kant is favored by Jordan who writes the following about 
Kant’s argument:
Suppose we are asked to accept the proposition that all our rational 
assessments have sufficient –not just necessary– causal conditions. In or-
der to show that we ought to believe this, someone would need to produce 
evidence which is seen to conform to criteria of reasonable trustworthiness 
and which is recognized to confer [. . .] certainty or sufficient probability 
upon it. But if the proposition is true, this could never happen, for it im-
plies that whether anyone believes it and what he considers trustworthy 
evidence and acceptable principles of inference are determined altogether 
by conditions that have no assured congruence with the proposition’s own 
merits or with criteria of sound argumentation whose validity consists 
in more than that we accept them. (53-54)
The principle that Jordan attributes to Kant, then, is that if de-
terminism is true, our rational assessments of a proposition “have no 
assured congruence with the proposition’s own merits”, and this is 
roughly equivalent to (P4).
What, then, are we to make of (P4)? This principle does not have 
much intuitive appeal. Consider again the case of beliefs formed on 
the basis of sense-perception. The reason I believe, say, that there’s a 
book on the table is because the book has impacted my visual system 
in some way, and had the book not been there, it would not have im-
pacted my visual system in that way. So, it seems clear that in that kind 
of case, the reason why I believe that there’s a book on the table is both 
the outcome of certain deterministic processes, and my believing it 
is correlated with the truth of the proposition. And it’s not clear why 
other cases of rational assessment would be any different. For example, 
a calculator functions in a deterministic way, but there’s no reason to 
think that a calculator’s results “have no assured congruence with the 
[output’s] own merits.” Why couldn’t we think of human minds in 
roughly the same way? That is, why couldn’t we think that the mind is 
just like a very complex calculator or computer, and that humans of-
ten get things right (i.e. by producing accurate judgments) in the same 
way in which calculators and computers often get things right (i.e. by 
producing accurate outputs)?
Now, one possible reason why one might think that there’s a dif-
ference between the two cases might have to do with the nature of the 
connection between the fact’s being true and the agent believing 
the proposition that is required for that belief to be justified. Consider 
again the Ned case. Suppose that p is the claim that the drinking water 
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contains chemicals that can affect one’s beliefs. And suppose, as in the 
original Ned case, that Ned believes this purely because the chemicals in 
the drinking water have affected his brain in such a way that he comes 
to believe the proposition, but without knowing why. In this case, upon 
discovering the true origin of the belief, Ned is rationally obligated to 
view himself as having been rationally unjustified in holding it. The fact 
that he believes p is a result, in part, of the truth of p.
So, a better account of why Ned cannot be rationally justified in 
the original case might appeal to the thought that if one is rationally 
justified in believing something one must have the right sort of access 
to the reasons why one believes the proposition, such as, for example, to 
be able to explain why one holds the view, upon being prompted. Thus, 
we might state the principle as follows:
(P5) If s is unaware of why she believes some claim p, then s cannot 
take herself to be rationally justified in believing p.
In order for Kant to get to his desired conclusion, he would need 
something like the following principle:
(P6) If determinism is true, then no one believes as the result of 
grasping reasons for believing.
So, this could help explain why one would think that if determin-
ism is true, we cannot be rationally justified in our beliefs, because you 
might think that being justified in a belief requires a sort of awareness of 
the reasons why one believes what one does. And one might think that 
insofar as determinism implies that our beliefs are caused by material 
processes, which we don’t have direct mental access to, determinism 
implies that we are not aware of the reasons for our beliefs in the right 
sort of way. How exactly this argument is supposed to work, though, 
will require closer attention. So let us begin by examining (P6) in some-
what more detail.
This principle does seem to have some intuitive appeal, and I think 
there is evidence to believe that this is something like what Kant had 
in mind. Let me begin by discussing the evidence for attributing this 
view to Kant, and then I’ll comment on the philosophical tenability of 
this position.
Kant advances a very similar argument to the one under consid-
eration from gms iii in a review of a book by Johann Heinrich Schulz 
(1783), just two years before Kant completed the manuscript of the gms. 
After a summary of Schulz’s book (cf. rs viii 10-12) and a few sympathetic 
remarks (cf. id. 12-13), Kant writes: “However, no impartial reader [...] 
will fail to note that the general fatalism which is the most prominent 
principle in this work and the most powerful one, affecting all morality, 
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turns all human conduct into a mere puppet show” (id. 13). Kant goes 
on the next page to raise an argument against fatalism:
Although he [Schulz] would not himself admit it, he has assumed 
in the depths of his soul that understanding is able to determine his jud-
gment in accordance with objective grounds that are always valid and is 
not subject to the mechanism of merely subjectively determining causes, 
which could subsequently change; hence he always admits freedom to 
think without which there is no reason. (rs viii 14)6
The thought here is that if determinism is true, we must regard our 
beliefs or rational assessments as “subject to the mechanism of merely 
subjectively determining causes”, whereas in order to regard ourselves as 
rationally justified in holding some belief, we must regard that belief as 
a result of “the judgment in accordance with objective grounds that are 
always valid.” By “subjectively determining causes,” I take it, Kant is 
referring to the mechanisms through which one came to hold some belief. 
These are subjective in the sense that they apply by virtue of facts about 
the situation that could fail to obtain. But why couldn’t someone think 
that a belief is both the result of subjectively  determining causes in this 
sense and also in accordance with objective grounds? Wood offers the 
following analysis of Kant’s argument in this passage:
Fatalism [i.e. the view that “our actions are necessitated by the me-
chanism of nature and that this precludes practical freedom”] would have 
no philosophical interest if fatalists could not also represent themselves as 
denying freedom for good reasons. [...] But that means they must already 
presuppose both in themselves and in others the capacity to act according 
to rational norms in settling theoretical questions. That capacity, however 
–the capacity to act according to norms of reason– presupposes freedom. 
It follows that fatalists must presuppose the contradictory of what they 
are trying to prove even in undertaking to prove it. (2007 131-132)
So, on Wood’s view, the reason why we cannot think of a belief as 
both the outcome of subjectively determining causes and as based on 
objective grounds is that in order to regard a belief as based on objec-
tive grounds, one must regard oneself as free. This analysis puts us in 
a position to formulate an initial argument for (P6):
1. If s believes p on the basis of reasons, s is free.
2. If determinism is true, then no one is free.
6 „Er hat aber im Grunde seiner Seele, obgleich er es sich selbst nicht gestehen wollte, voraus 
gesetzt: daß der Verstand nach objectiven Gründen, die jederzeit gültig sind, sein Urtheil 
zu bestimmen das Vermögen habe und nicht unter dem Mechanism der blos subjectiv 
bestimmenden Ursachen, die sich in der Folge ändern können, stehe; mithin nahm er 
immer Freiheit zu denken an, ohne welche es keine Vernunft giebt.” 
[192]
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3. Therefore, if determinism is true, one never believes on the ba-
sis of reasons.
4. Therefore, if determinism is true, then no one believes as a result 
of grasping reasons for believing P6.
Premise 2 follows from Kant’s incompatibilism, so the only premise 
that requires attention for our purposes is 1. And, in order to understand 
why Kant endorses 1, we need to understand what it means,  according 
to Kant, to believe on the basis of reasons.7 One intuitive way of glossing 
what it is to believe on the basis of reasons is to say that the reasons for 
believing the proposition caused the belief in some way (i.e. they  mediately 
caused the belief through the agent’s grasping or  recognizing them). 
However, although Kant thinks that reasons may explain the fact that 
an agent believes something, he does not believe that reasons can cause 
a belief. This is because, according to Kant, for x to cause y, there must 
be some law according to which whenever x is present, y follows of neces-
sity.8 By contrast, it cannot be the case that the fact that there are good 
reasons for acting or believing, or even that the agent recognizes that 
there are good reasons for acting or believing is itself sufficient for an 
agent acting or believing in that way. The fact that I have good reasons 
to act or believe in a certain way will not itself bring it about that I do 
believe or act in a certain way. For example, if I’m a weak-willed agent 
I might act contrary to what I know to be the course of action that I 
have most reason to do. Thus, as Leibniz says, reasons merely “incline 
without necessitating” (128; cf. Locke book ii, chapter xxi, §§47, 51-52, 
71, 263-266, 282-284).
Now the epistemic case is a bit more complicated in that it does 
seem that recognizing reasons for belief can be sufficient to generate a 
belief. It doesn’t seem inconceivable, though, that one could genuinely 
recognize (decisive) reasons for believing and yet still not believe, for 
example, the psychological phenomenon referred to as denial. It seems, 
then, reasonable to think that reason, in the epistemic case, is the same 
as in the practical case.
So, given this account, we can formulate an argument for (1) along 
the following lines:
1. If s believes p on the basis of good reasons, then reasons for be-
lieving p explain the belief in some way.
7 On this account of believing for reasons, I follow Wood (cf. 127-128).
8 See, for example, his characterization of causation in the first Critique: “Every cause 
pre-supposes a rule according to which certain appearances follow as effects, and every 
rule requires a uniformity in its effects” (a 549/b 577).
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2. If reasons explain the belief, then it cannot be the case that ma-
terial conditions are sufficient to explain the belief.
3. If material conditions are not sufficient for the formation of the 
belief, then one could have believed otherwise.
4. Therefore, if one believes p on the basis of reasons, then one could 
have believed otherwise.
5. If one could have believed otherwise, then one is free.
6. Therefore, if s believes p on the basis of reasons, then s is free.
Premise 1 falls out of the analysis of what it is, according to Kant, to 
believe on the basis of reasons. Premise 3, likewise, seems straightfor-
ward: if it is not necessitated that I do φ, then I could have failed to do 
φ. And 5 follows from the plausible principle that one can act otherwise 
if and only if one is free to do so.
Premise 2 is a little more difficult, but I think it has a good basis in 
Kant as well. Consider, for example, the following passage in the first 
Critique:
It is easy to see that if all causality in the world of sense were mere 
nature, then every occurrence would be determined in time by another 
in accord with necessary laws, and hence —since appearances, insofar 
as they determine the power of choice, would have to render every action 
necessary as their natural consequence— the abolition of transcendental 
freedom would also simultaneously eliminate all practical freedom. 
For the latter presupposes that although something has not happened, 
it  nevertheless ought to have happened, and its cause in appearance was 
thus not so determining that there is not a causality in our power of choice 
such that independently of those natural causes and even opposed to their 
power and influence it might [...] begin a series of occurrences  entirely 
from itself. (krv a534/b562)9
The thought here, I take it, is that if an account of action in terms of 
that action’s deterministic causes is complete, there will be no room left 
to explain normative facts like whether the action ought to have been 
done. If considerations of what reasons the agent had for acting have a 
place in the explanation of the action, then the action must not be de-
termined in the strong sense (the causes were “so determining”) that 
deterministic explanation is fully sufficient to account for the action.
So, the underlying principle behind 2 is, I think, intuitive enough. 
We might state it as:
(P7) If p is a sufficient condition for r, and q is distinct from p, then 
q cannot be a necessary condition for r.
9 Guyer and Wood translation (1998).
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An illustration of why one might think that this is true might be 
the following. If my paying the relevant amount of money to buy a car 
from a dealership is a sufficient condition for my obtaining the car, then it 
 cannot also be the case that making a good impression on the  salesperson 
is a necessary condition for me to obtain the car. If I pay for it, I’ll get the 
car regardless of whether I make a good impression. Likewise, it is not 
prima facie implausible to think that if neurophysiological states are a 
sufficient condition for me to believe p, then it cannot also be the case 
that the presence of good reasons for believing p is also a  necessary 
condition for my believing p. And, if you add the principle used 
above that if a belief is not caused by the recognition of reasons for 
believing, then the belief is not justified, then one gets the conclusion 
that if neurophysiological states are sufficient condition for believing, then 
no beliefs are justified.
Is Kant’s Argument Sound?
Nonetheless, upon further reflection, I think this principle can be 
decisively seen to be false. Consider the following example. If the car 
in the above case costs $20,000 dollars, then having $25,000 dollars at 
my disposal is a sufficient condition for me to be able to buy the car. But 
it is still true that having $20,000 dollars at my disposal is a necessary 
condition for me to be able to purchase the car, even though these are 
distinct properties. The logic here is simple. If p implies q, and p is a suf-
ficient condition for r, then even if p and q are distinct properties, q is 
also a necessary condition for r. Goldman makes the same point when 
he introduces the notion of simultaneous nomic equivalents, which he 
characterizes as follows: If there is a law such that
for any object of kind h at time t, the object has property Ø at t if and 
only if it has the property Ψ at t[,] then if a particular object a has proper-
ties Φ and Ψ at a particular time t1, I shall say that a’s having Φ at t1, is a 
“simultaneous nomic equivalent” of a’s having Ψ at t1. (473)
So, if a’s having Ψ and a’s having Φ are simultaneous nomic equiva-
lents, then although a’s having Ψ is a sufficient condition for a’s having 
Ø, a’s having Φ is a necessary condition as well.
How does all of this relate to the issue of whether one can think of 
a belief as both based on good reasons and the product of  deterministic 
processes? Let Ψ be the property of having good reasons to believe p, 
and let Φ be the property of being in a certain brain state that is such as 
to cause (necessitate) one to believe p. Let us also grant with Leibniz 
and Kant that reasons act as a cause of beliefs or actions in a different 
way than, on the deterministic picture, brain states or whatever do. 
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This suffices to show that a’s having Ψ and a’s having Φ are not the same. 
But it does not at all suffice to show that Ψ and Φ are not, in Goldman’s 
terms, simultaneous nomic equivalents. And if they are simultaneous 
nomic equivalents, it is open to the determinist to say that although mental 
states are the result of sufficient material conditions, the recognition of 
good reasons is at least sometimes causally necessary to produce a belief.
So, suppose determinism is true, and for every belief there is some 
set of material conditions c that is responsible for my holding that 
belief. It does not follow that I do not hold that belief on the basis of 
good reasons because it may be the case that c entails c*, that the agent 
recognizes good reasons for holding that belief. In that case c can be 
sufficient for the belief, and c might be non-identical to c*, but none-
theless c and c* are simultaneous nomic equivalents, and thus c* is 
necessary for the belief.
Now, Hasker has tried to answer Goldman’s objection by appeal-
ing to the fact that, in order for one to be rationally justified in holding 
some belief, that belief must not only be held on the basis of reasons, it 
must be held on the basis of good reasons. He writes:
On Goldman’s view, my accepting such and such as a reason, which 
may in fact happen to be a good one, is a necessary condition of my re-
aching a particular conclusion. But the reason’s being a good one is not 
a necessary condition. [...] But for me to be justified in holding a belief 
surely means that I hold it because I have good reasons, and would not 
hold it otherwise. (179)
I see no reason, however, why Goldman’s account could not accom-
modate the thought that sometimes people believe things because they 
recognize good reasons for doing so. There’s nothing to prevent Goldman 
from saying that reasons cause belief and sometimes good epistemic 
agents are sensitive to whether the reason in question is a good one. 
A good epistemic agent (qua good epistemic agent) will only believe on the 
basis of good reasons, and, therefore, in cases where someone is  behaving 
as a good epistemic agent, the goodness of the reasons for belief are 
relevant.
A Remedy for Kant’s Argument
So, I think that if this analysis of Kant’s argument is right, the ar-
gument is a bad one. I want now to briefly explore how the argument 
might be changed so as to avoid the difficulty raised by the possibility 
of simultaneous nomic equivalents. One way to do this is to modify 
the view that Kant’s argument is meant to rule out. In the foregoing, I 
have taken it for granted that the view that Kant is directed against is 
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fatalism or determinism.10 I think, though, that if we take it not to be 
an argument that regarding ourselves as rational is incompatible with 
determinism simpliciter but rather, determinism and a certain view 
about the explanation of mental events, the argument turns out to be 
much more plausible.
Before I discuss that principle, though, I should note that there’s an 
exegetical issue here as to whether the assumption that Kant is directing 
his argument simply against determinism is true. I have not defended 
this assumption because I think it is the most natural way to read the 
texts with which I have been dealing, and trying to settle the exegetical 
issue would be beyond the scope of the essay. But I do not think that it is 
obvious that there is not a more complex dialectic going on here. So, 
depending on what the claim that one takes Kant to be arguing against 
is, Kant might have been arguing against something like the position 
I am about to sketch.
The principle that I have in mind is what Kim calls the “Principle 
of Explanatory Exclusion” and formulates as follows: “No event can be 
given more than one complete and independent explanation” (79). So, 
let e be a mental event –the formation of a belief, for example– and let 
c be the material conditions that cause the belief and c* the rational 
conditions that cause the belief. Call c the material cause and c* the 
rationalizing cause. If there are simultaneous nomic equivalents then 
both c and c* could be complete and in-dependent explanations of 
the fact that the agent has formed the belief. A material  explanation 
would be complete, if it were not necessary to refer to any other 
material event or fact in order to explain the event. Likewise, a rationalizing 
explanation would be complete if there was no consideration or  weighing 
of a consideration that is necessary to explain why she formed the belief. 
These two kinds of explanations could be independent in that it is not 
necessary to refer to rationalizing facts in order to explain the material 
facts and vice versa.
Suppose, then, that one endorses the Principle of Explanatory 
Exclusion and thinks that mental events are explicable by reference to 
material conditions. Either that person must identify responding to 
reasons as part of the material explanation of the belief, or they must 
say that reasons do not figure in the complete explanation of the belief. 
10 The terms “fatalism” and “determinism” are today usually used to denote different 
views. Determinism, roughly, denotes the view that all events are necessitated by the 
conjunction of the laws of nature and the initial state of the universe, or simply laws of 
nature and antecedent states of the world, whereas fatalism is used to denote the view 
that we cannot act other than we do act. But I take it, on the basis of Wood’s character-
ization of fatalism above, that the term had a broader usage at Kant’s time, so I follow 
that usage and take determinism and fatalism to be roughly equivalent.
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We have already seen a Kantian argument against thinking that 
 responding to reasons can be part of the material explanation. The 
thought there was that all material causes necessitate their effects, but 
reasons never function this way, so responding to reasons cannot be 
part of the material cause. Therefore, the proponent of the Principle of 
Explanatory Exclusion who believes determinism is true is left with 
the conclusion that reasons do not figure into the complete explana-
tion of why someone holds a belief. Now if we add the principle that 
in order for a belief to be justified it must be caused in some way by 
the recognition of reasons for believing, we have an argument for the 
claim that if determinism and the Principle of Explanatory Exclusion 
are true, then no beliefs are rationally justified. We can formulate the 
argument as follows:
1. Reasons cannot explain beliefs in the same way that material 
conditions do.
2. Therefore, reference to reasons are not necessary in a complete 
material explanation of a belief.
3. Therefore, if determinism is true and the Principle of Explanatory 
Exclusion is true, reasons do not explain beliefs.
4. If s believes p on the basis of reasons, then reasons for believing 
p explain the belief in some way.
5. Therefore, if determinism and the Principle of Explanatory 
Exclusion are true, no one believes on the basis of reasons.
Conclusion
I have argued for a particular interpretation of Kant’s argument 
that regarding oneself as rational implies regarding oneself as free. 
This argument is, I think, a bad one because it neglects the possibility 
of what Goodman calls simultaneous nomic equivalents. One way to 
reformulate Kant’s argument so as to avoid this difficulty is by taking 
him not to be arguing against determinism simpliciter, but against the 
view that determinism is true and that mental events can only be ex-
plained as material phenomena. Taking the argument that way yields 
an interesting and not implausible argument.
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